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INHERITANCE.
(Second and last part.)
LINEAL RELATIONSHIP.

When the lineal heirs are all of the same degree, all children, or grand-children, or great grand-children, the estate,
real and personal, descends upon them in equal shares; that is
_75er capila. One son may have left one child and another son
seven. The seven will not together take the half, nor the one
the other half, which their parents, had they been alive would
have taken, but each one will take an eighth. When the lineal
heirs are of different degrees, the 2d section of the act of April
8th, 1833, P. L. 316 provides (a) if there is a child, each child
shall receive such share as he or she would have received, if all
the children, the dead at the death of the intestate, leaving issue, had been alive; (b) if there is no child but a grand-child,
each grand-child shall receive such share as he or she would
have received if all the other grand-children, then dead, but
leaving issue, had been living at the intestate's death. -In every
such case, the issue of a deceased child, grand-child or other descendant, shall take by representation of their parents respectively such share only as would have descended on such parents
if they -had been living at the intestate's death.
BROTHERS AND SISTERS AND ISSUE.

If the persons to inherit are brothers and sisters of the
whole blood and no nephews and nieces, children of a deceased
brother or sister, the real estate descends to and vests in the
brothers and sisters, in equal shares, i. e., per capita. If the
235
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persons to inherit are nephews and nieces, children of brothers
and sisters of the whole blood, the real estate vests in such
nephews and nieces. When there are brothers and sisters and
children of deceased brothers and sisters, every brother and sister shall receive such share as he or she would have received, if
all the brothers and sisters, thien dead, but leaving children,
were alive at the death of the intestate. Such nephews and
nieces shall take by representation of the parents respectively
the share that would have descended to the parents, if they had
been living at the death of the intestate. The 8th section of the
act of April 8th, 1833, contained the 1j roviso "that there shall
be no representation admitted amongst collaterals other than
brothers' and sisters' children." The 2d section of the act of
April 27th, 1855, modified this by providing that "Among collaterals, where by existing laws entitled to inherit, the real and
personal estate shall descend and be distributed among the
grand-children of brothers and sisters, and the children of
uncles and aunts by representation, such descendants taking
equally among them such shares as their parent would have
taken, if living." The effect of this act of 1855 is to make a
new class of collateral heirs, as distinct from the next of kin,'
that is, the grand-children of brothers and sisters, take along
with brothers and sisters, or the children of brothers and sisters,
or there being none of these, they take, in the order in which
they would have taken, under the act of 1833, that is, in the
absence of issue, they take, as a distinct class, to the exclusion
of persons who are nearer of kin, e. g., a father, or a grandfather', or an uncle. A dies, leaving children of deceased brothers
and sisters, and also children of a deceased child of a deceased
brother or sister, (i. e.. grand-nephews). The grand nephews
take A'sestate, along with the nephews and nieces.2 There is
no statutory provision for great grand-nephews and nieces as a
'Lane's Appeal, 28 Pa. 487; Perot's Appeal, 102 Pa. 257; McConnell's
Appeal, 5 Super. 120.
2
Lane's Appeal, 28 Pa. 487; Krout's Appeal, 60 Pa. 880; Lebo's Appeal, 3 Luz. Leg. Obs. 103; Umstead's Estate, 21 Mont. 190." But they
take per stirpes; that is, such part as their deceased parent would have
taken, had he been alive at the death of the intestate. The nephews
and nieces take not by representation; that is, not the part that their
parents would have taken, but per capita. Krout's Appeal, 60 Pa. 380;
Lowry's Estate, 6 Super. 143, 147.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
distinct class. They must take simply as being in any case, the
next of kin; but as such they would not take along with any of
the classes whose inheritance is especially provided for. Hence,
an act of Congress about 1890, awarding moneys to the heirs
and next of kin of X, who had died in 1836, and his next of kin
being, in 1890, three grand nephews and nieces, (children of the
same parent), one grand niece, (child of another parent) and two
great grand nieces, it was held that the great grand -niece could
not share along with the grand nephews and nieces. The latter
took jber calia..
UNCLES AND AUNTS.

Uncles and aunts are not made a special class by the intestate acts. They inherit only as next of kin, in the absence of
persons of the special classes. The special classes are the issue
of the intestate, his brothers or sisters of the whole blood, or
their children or grandchildren; the remoter issue of brothers
and sisters, being ncst of kin, his parents, his brothers and sisters of the half-blood, or their children or grandchildren, the
remoter issue of brothers and sisters of the half-blood, being
next of kin; in default of persons within any of these special
classes, says section 7 act of 1833, the "real and personal estate
of the intestate shall descend to and be distributed among the
next of kin of such intestate."
Uncles and aunts are related to
the intestate in the third degree; the children of uncles and
aunts, i. e. cousins, in the fourth degree. The 8th section of
the act of 1853' expressly provided that there should be no
representatives admitted amongst collaterals, after brothers' and
sisters' children. Hence, the children of dead uncles and aunts
could not inherit along with living uncles and aunts. The latter would inherit to their xclusion. 5 The act of April 27th,
1855, provides for the representation of dead uncles and aunts, by
their children, and ordains that their children shall take equally
3

Kngston's Estate, 28 W. N. 284.
'Prior to the act of 1833, children of deceased nephews and nieces
could have inherited, but not under the act of 1833; Wood's Appeal, 18
Pa. 478; Cf. Parr v. Bankhart, 22 Pa. 291.
5Good v. Herr, 7 W. & S., 255; Montgomery v. Petriken, 29 Pa. 118;
Herr v. Herr, 5 Pa. 428; Parr v. Bankhart, 22 Pa. 291. This decision led
to the enactment of the act of 1855, says Penrose, J., Haines' Estate, 12
C. C., 401; and Over, J., McConnell's Appeal, 5 Super. 120.
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the share that the parent would have taken, if living. Hence,
when the next of kin are an uncle, a cousin, (child of a dead
uncle), and another cousin, (child of another dead uncle), each
takes one third of the estate of the intestate.6 The children of
the dead uncle take Per stirpes, that is, the share that their
parent would have taken.' There being -two children of a deceased uncle, four children of another deceased uncle, and five
children of a deceased aunt, the estate of the intestate was divided into three equal parts. The two children of the first
uncle each took one sixth, the four children of the other, each
one twelfth, and the five children of the aunt, each one fifteenth.8
The act of June 30th, 1885, P. L. 251, however, has directed
that in all cases where those who take the intestate's property
are in the same degree of relationship, they shall take in equal
shares.'
SECOND COUSINS.

The children of cousins, i. e. the grandchildren of uncles
and aunts do not take by representation of their parents or
grand-parents. If there are uncles and aunts, or cousins, second
cousins, children of deceased uncles and aunts, will not inherit
along with them, but will be wholly excluded."0 Nor is this
changed by the act of May 25th, 1887, except in the case in
which one or more of the next of kin who are entitled, are
grand-parents."
GREAT-GREAT UNCLE.

The act of 1833 excludes representation among collaterals;
after brothers and sisters of the intestate.
6
Haines'
7

A deceased great-

Estate, 12 C. C. 401 Realty.
Hayes' Appeal, 89 Pa. 256; Brenneman's Appeal, 40 Pa. 115; Danner v. Shissler, 31 Pa. 289.
8
Brenneman's Appeal, 40 Pa. 115; Roger's Estate, 131 Pa. 382;
Hayes' Appeal, 89 Pa. 256.
gThe act was passed to change the doctrine of Hayes' Appeal, 89 Pa.
256, which distributed the estate per stirpes; Bambers' Estate, 13 C. C.
403.
1"Clendaniel's Estate, 12 Phila. 54 (personal); Rogers Estate, 131 Pa.
382; Bell's Appeal, 147 Pa. 383; Mays' Estate, 11 Dist. 178; Smith's
Estate, 10 Dist. 92.
"2 Stewart, Purd. 1999; Bambers' Estate, 13 C. C. 403; White's Estate, 5 Dist. 103; Whitaker's Estate, 175 Pa. 139; Whitaker's Estate, 17
C. C. 358.
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great uncle left two children, and grand-children (children of
deceased childreh). The latter could not inherit along with the
former. The two children, being next of kin, took to the exclusion of children of deceased brothers."
I

GRAND-PARENT

ONE OF THE NEXT OF KIN.

The act of May 25th, 1887 P. L. 261, provides for the case
in which the next of kin as such, take the estate of the decedent
under the intestate law, and the grand-parent, or grand-parents,
shall be one or more of these next of kin, and there are descendants of'a deceased grand-parent. It provides that the descendant's of such deceased grand-parent, shall represent him or her
and shall take the share which he or she, if living, would take.
This*act does not repeal the provisions against representation in
the case of collaterals found in the acts of 1833 and 1855. It
was passed to avert the principle of McDowell v. Addams, 45 Pa.
430 where a living grand-parent was allowed to take to the exclusion of the descendants of a dead one,"3 and is confined to the
single case in which there is a living grandparent, who is next
of kin, and the descendant of a dead grandparent."
The act
provides for representation of the dead grandparents, by any descendant, however remote, and partially supersedes the principle
that among ,"ollaterals, there shall be no representation beyond
grandchildren of brothers and sisters, and children of uncles and
aunts.
RULE FOR DETERMINING NEARNESS OF KIN.

For the computation of the propinquity of those who are
collaterally related to the decedent, there are two rules, the
canon, or common law rule, and the civil law rule. By the
former, the computation is made by finding ie common ancescor, by whom the decedent and claimant are related, and counting along the line which is the longer; to the decedent, if he is
farther from the common ancestor; otherwise to the claimant.
A and his nephew B are related through A's father, who is also
the father of B. The nephew is farther from this father, than
is A. He is two steps from the father. He is related to A, his
2
1 Perot's
3

Appeal, 102 Pa. 257.
1Bamber's Estate, 13 C. C. 403; Whitaker's Estate, 5 Dist. 83;
Whitaker's Estate, 5 Dist. 4.
"Whitaker's Estate, 175 Pa., 139; Whites' Estate, 5 Dist. 103.
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uncle, in the second degree. The civil law method is to count
the degrees on both lines. By that method the nephew would
be related to the uncle in the third degree. Two steps would
carry him to his grandfather, the father of his uncle, and another
step would carry him from the grandfather to the uncle. This
Hence, the
is the method which is adopted in Pennsylvania."
claimants of the intestate's personal property being paternal
uncles and aunts, and a maternal grandmother, it was awarded
to the grandmother, as nearer of kin. Land descending, the
claimants being paternal grandparents, uncles and aunts, the
grandparents inherited it.' 6 A died, owning land which had
come to him expjarle malerna. He died leaving a father, and,
as next of kin, his great-grandfather on his mother's side, and
children of this great-grandfather. The father, not being of the
blood of the perquisitor, the great-grandfather, being one deAunts are
gree nearer than his children, inherited A's laud.'
one degree nearer to the intestate, than children of deceased
uncles and aunts. " The children of a nephew or niece, are one
degree farther than the nephew or niece. 9
ADOPTED CHILDREN.

It is not in the power of the legislature to make him who
was born of A and B, to have been born of C and D,' but it is
possible for it to impose on him the duties and the rights and
powers which he would have had, if he had been born of C and
D, and probable to divest him of the rights, powers and duty
"McDowell v. Addams, 45 Pa. 430; Sturgeon v, Hustead, 196 Pa. 148.
16Nichol v. Hall, 28 Pitts. L. J. 239. The claimants of personalty
being the paternal grandmother, the two maternal grandparents, and
both paternal and maternal uncles and aunts, the grandparents took, to
the exclusion of the uncles and aunts. Fister's Estate, 2 Woodw.
323.
'7Sturgeon v. Hustead, 106 Pa. 148. In May v. Espenshade, 1 Pears.
139 for some reason it was held that uncles and aunts were of the same
degree of kinship as grandparents.
"'Parr v. Bankhart, 22 Pa. 291.
19Ranck's Appeal, 113 Pa. 98.
10"Giving an adopted son a right to inherit, does not make him a son
in fact," discovers Lowrie, C. J., who thence infers that he must pay
the collateral inheritance tax. Com. v. Nancrede, 32 Pa. 389. Cf.
Waynes' Estate, 18 W. N. C. 10 and cases there cited. Special adoption statutes have relieved the adopted from the tax. Com. v. Henderson 172 Pa. 135. Others Eave rot, C(m. v. Fergukcn, 187 Pa. E95.
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which pertained to him by reason of his actual birth from A and
B. This power of adoption might be exerted by the legislature
prior to 1874 by special law."1 The constitution at present ordains that no local or special law shall be passed "authorizing
the adoption or the legitimation of children.""2 The act of
May 19, 1887, P. L. 125, furnishes a method of adoption by a decree of the court of common pleas upon petition of
the person who desires to adopt. The court, if it approves, decrees that the child shall assume the name of the adopting parent, and have all the rights of a child and heir of such adopting
parent and be subject to the duties of such child; if the adopting parent has other children, "the adopted shall have inheritance only as one of them, in case of intestacy, and he, she or
they shall respectively inherit from and through each other, as
The
if all had been the lawful children of the same parent." '
act of 1887, and its predecessor, the act of May 4th, 1855, P. L.
431, made reasonably distinct provision for the inheritance by
the adopted from the adopting. When the adopted child is a
grand-child, it is, in law, transferred from the class of grandchild to that of child. It inherits from the adopting parent
(the natural grandparent) only as child, and not, at the same
time, as grand-child. In 1855 R, having two daughters and two
grand-children, a son and daughter of a deceased daughter,
adopted the grand-daughter. He died intestate in 1901. The
granddaughter was entitled only to a child's share of the grandfather's estate, that is, to one quarter of the estate. The share
of her mother, thus reduced to a quarter, instead of a third,
went wholly to the grandson, her brother.2 So far as land is
2

1Com.

v. Henderson, 172 Pa. 135; Com. v. Ferguson, 137 Pa. 595,

(distinguishing between adoption and legitimation).
22
Act III, sect. 7.
"The act of May 9th, 1889 P. L. 168, contains a similar provision, for
adoption of adult persons, with their consent. After land had descended,
a law giving validity to adoptions, not previously valid, could not constitutionally take the land from the heirs and give it to the adopted children. Ballard v. Ward, 89 Pa. 358. When A dies, leaving a widow and
an adopted child, the widow is not entitltd to one half of the personalty,

but only to one third of it, and the child two thirds. Nulton's Estate,

4 Kulp, 155.
24
Morgan v. Reel, 213 Pa. 81. In Susman's Estate, 45 Pitts. L. J.
101 on the death of A, two persons claimed his personal estate by adoption. Although the adoption was inoperative, effect was given to the
contract to adopt, except so far as the -Tight of the widow of A, were
concerned.

242

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

concerned, is the rule that the heir must be of the blood of the
perquisitor in the case of the adopted child superseded? A devised land to X in trust to pay the rents to her son B during his
life, and immediately after his death to convey the land "to such
person or persons, and for such estate or estates, and in such
proportions as would by the intestate laws of this Commonwealth,
be entitled to the same, if he had died intestate seised thereof in
fee." Eighteen years afterwards B adopted C, a step-daughter,
as his daughter. On the death of B, a year later, it was decided that C was entitled to the land, under A's will, in fee;
that is, she would, under the intestate law [the act of May 4th,
1885, concerning adoption] have been entitled, if B had died intestate seised of the land in fee.' She, [C] is not, it is argued"
says Gordon, J., "of the blood of the testatrix, and therefore the
testatrix did not intend to vest in her this remainder. But this
is an imaginary intent, evolved for the occasion-one which Mrs.
Johnson [A] if we regard her words, never entertained. * * *
There is therefore nothing left for conjecture." The gift over was
to such persons as would be entitled to land, of which B should
die seised in fee intestate. But, there are two classes of such
land; ancestral and non-ancestral, both taking different descents.
Which of these did A, the testatrix have in mind? The court,
apparently with only a surmise to support the dictum, decides
that she meant the course with respect to non-ancestral property.
INHERITING FROM THE ADOPTED.

The act of 1887, and its predecessors, provided for inheritance by the adopted from the adopting parents, and by
it or the natural children, if any of the adopting parents, from each other. They do not seem to have provided
for cases where there are no natural children, and where
the competing claimants are one of the adopting parents, and
the natural parent. A and his wife B, adopted C. C subsequently died, after the- death of A, owning personalty' which
had come to her from her maternal [natural] grandmother;
her natural father surviving her. It was held that the father took
25

Johnson's Appeal, 88 Pa. 346. In Daisey's Estate, 17 Phila. 427,
Penrose, J., expresses the opinion that the adopted child could not, under the 9th section of the act of April 8th, 1833, acquire an inheritance
in land, descending from one as to whom he was not of the blood.
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the estate under the intestate law, and not, B, the surviving
adopting mother. Reasonable, as it would be, that the adopter,
who cherished, maintained and educated C in infancy, and until
her death, a period of 22 years, should inherit her estate, in
preference to the father who renounced the duties of a parent to
her, it is for the legislature, not the court, thinks the Common
Pleas, to consider this reasonableness. The intestate law has
not been superseded in this respect by the adoption law."
As
natural brothers do not inherit personalty from each other, unless both parents are dead, if an adopted child dies, leaving personalty, the natural children of the adopting parents will not inherit, unless both of the adopting parents are dead. Ifeither is
living, the property will not pass to them or either of them, nor
to their natural children, but to the natural brothers and sisters,
if any, of the adopted child. The act of May 4th, 1855 like that
of 1887 says that the adopted child and' the children of the
adopting parent, shall inherit from each other, "as if all had
been the lawful children of the same parent."
1887.
The act of April 13th. 1887, [2 Stewart Purdon 2006] provides
for the death of an adopted child intestate and without issue. The
adopting parents, their lawful heirs and kindred, are to be treated,
and to inherit from such child the same as if it were the natural
child and heir at law of such adopting parent, to the exclusion of
the natural parents, kindred and heirs at law of such child. To
the husband and wife of the adopted child, are reserved all his or
her rights under ,'he intestate law If either or both the adopting
parents die intestate, the adopted child shall inherit the same as
though he were the natural child and heir at law. But this act
applies only to such property as the adopted child shalt have inherited or derived from the adopting parents or their kindred.
ACT OF APRIL 13TH,

"6Com. v. Powel, 16 W. N. C. 297.
17Daisey's Estate, 17 Phila. 427. In Foley's Estate, 1 W. N. C. 301,
C was adopted by B, a woman in Massachusetts, according to its law.
C subsequently came to reside in Pennsylvania, and died, a minor. Held,
as A, her father, and B, the adopting mother, both resided in Massachusetts, the law of Massachusetts regulates the descent of her personalty;
and the money was awarded to the adopting mother.
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ILLEGITIMATES.

"The incapacity of a bastard ' says Blackstone, 1 Comm.
459, "consists principally in this, that he cannot be an heir to any
one, neither can he have heirs, but of his own body, for being
nu/liusflius, he is therefore of kin to nobody and has no ancestor from whom any inheritable blood can be derived." The act
of April 27th, 1855, P. L. 368, amended by the act of June 14th,
1897 P. L. 142, the act of June 5th, 1883, P. L. 88, and later
statutes not abolishing altogether, have modified the common
law to some extent.
POWER OF THE ILLEGITIMATE TO INHERIT FROM MOTHER.

The 3d section of the act of 1855 enacted that "Illegitimate
children shall take and be known by the name of their mother,
and they and their mother shall respectively have capacity to
take or inherit from each other personal estate as next of kin,
and real estate as heirs in fee simple."
When the illegitimate
is the only child, its power to inherit is clear.'
When there
are two or more illegitimate children, whether of the same father

or not [inquiry as to identical or different paternity is irrelevant] they inherit from the mother. But, suppose one or more
illegitimate children, and one or more legitimate children. Will
the former inherit pari passu with the latter, from the c6mmon
mother? This question was answered by Opdyke's Appeal.'
A, a woman, ditd leaving one legitimate and two illegitimate
children. A was seised of a house and lot. The three children
were held to have inherited the land, which was non-ancestral
as tenants in common. In 1850 a devise made intrust to pay the income to S for life. She had the power of appointing the corpus
by will to her issue. In default of such appointment, the
trustees were to hold the estate in trust for such persons as
would then be entitled, had S died absolute owner, and a widow,
8Waesch's Estate, 166 Pa. 204. The fact that the son is a resident of Germany, (or other foreign country) at the time of the
death of his mother, here, does not preclude his inheriting. The act of
1852, after conferring on mother and illegitimate children the power of
inheriting from each other personal and real estate adds "and as respects
said real or personal estate so taken and inherited to transmit the same
according to the intestate laws of the state." See some unintelligible
remarks upon this, by Read, J., in Grubb's Appeal, 58 Pa. 55.
2949 Pa. 373. Cf. Ringler's Estate, 1 Woodw. 328 (personalty).
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and intestate. S dying in 1867 leaving illegitimate children, it
was held that they were entitled to the corpus under the will.
Had S died absolute owner, they would have inherited."
INHERITANCE

OF ILLEGITIMATE PROM GRAND-MOTHER.

The act of June 14th, 1897 P. L. 142, declares that "Illegitimate children shall take and be known by the name of their
mother, and they and their issue and their mother and grandmother shall respectively have capacity to take or inherit from
each other personal estate as next of kin, and real estate as heirs
in fee simple." This apparently gives the illegitimate child
the power to inherit from its maternal grandmother.'
Why not
from its maternal grandfather?"2 It does not appear that any
later act forbids this inheritance, although, apparently, Solly,
P. J., thinks that the act of June 10th, 1901, P. L. 551 repeals
so much of the act of 1897 as gives power to the illegitimate to
inherit from the grandmother; and to the latter to inherit from
the former. The act of 1901 gives power to the children, some
of whom are illegitimate to inheri.t from each other, to the exclusion of the grandmother of the illegitimates. In 1904 it was
decided by Stewart, P. J., A dying leaving children, and the illegitimate child of a deceased daughter, that the illegitimate was
entitled to the share of the deceased daughter. "We find nothing in subsequent enactments [to the act of June 14, 1897]
which in any way changes or qualifies the rule of descent thereby established. 3
INHERITANCE

OF ILLEGITIMATES

FROM MOTHER'S COLLATERAL

RELATIVES.

The act of July 10th, 1901 P. L. 639, declares that illegitimate children, taking their mother's name shall not be deemed
"Seitzinger's Estate, 170 Pa. 500. That the act of 1855 was not in
existence when the devise went into operation, is immaterial. Cf. Miller's Appeal, 52 Pa. 113, McGunnigle v. McKee, 77 Pa. 81.
3
'Umstead's Estate, 31 C. C. 209. In Grubb's Appeal, 58 Pa. 55, 61 it
is assumed that the issue of an illegitimate would not inherit from the
grandmother.
3
1A bastard could not inherit under the act of April 27th, 1855, as
representing his deceased mother, from her father, his grandfather.
Yarnall's Estate, 4 Luz. L. Reg. 304; 2 Foster, 62 (1874).
3Diehl's Estate 29 C. C. 288, Danson's Estate, 11 Dist. 247; Ferguson, J., 1802.
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nullius filits. The mother and her heirs, and the child or its
heirs shall have capacity to take or inherit from or through each
other, personal or -real estate. By this act "Not only is such a
child made heir of the mother, and she of it, with capacity to
take and inherit from each other, but with the capacity also,"
says Solly, P. J., "to inherit through each other as next of kin
or heirs under the intestate laws, subject, nevertheless, as regards real estate to the-distinction of half bloods."
Hence, the
illegitimate children of a woman will inherit from her collateral
relations, in the same circumstances in which legitimate children
would do so. A died in 1903. Survived him brothers and sisters, also children and a legitimate grand child and an illegitimate grandson, of a deceased brother. This illegitimate was
entitled to the share of personal estate which his mother, a niece
of the deceased, would have taken had she been alive."
INHERITANCE BY CHILDREN OF ILLEGITI4ATES,

FROM MOTHER

OR HER RELATIVES.
5

It was held in Steckel's Appeal,
A dying in 1868, leaving
to survive her the son of an illegitimate son, and a legitimate
son, that the latter took the whole estate and the former nothing.
It was said that the act of April 27th, 1856 had provided only
for the inheritance of illegitimate children. "Had the legislature intended," said Sharswood, J., "not merely that illegitimate
children but the issue of illegitimate children should inherit, it
would have been easy to say so, but they seem carefully to confine the operation of the enactment to children taking from their
mother, so as to exclude the case of grand-children and grandmothers."
INHERITANCE OF CHILDREN

FROM EACH OTHER.

Under the act of 1855, the illegitimate children of X could
inherit from her, and she from them, but one of the children
could not inherit from another of them. A, B and C were the
illegitimate children of X, who was already dead, in 1871, when
A died, leaving a widow, and B and C, his brother and sister.
It was held in 1878, that B and C could not take any portion of
3'Umstead's Estate, 31 C. C. 209. It had been held in 1895, that an
illegitimate could not share ',in the estate of the brother of his mother,
his uncle. Rees' Estate, 166 Pa. 498.
3564 Pa. 493.
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A's personal property, the whole of which was awarded to the
widow.' The act of June 5th, 1883 ordains that illegitimates,
of the same mother, and leaving neither mother nor issue capable of inheriting, shall have capacity to take real and personal
property from each other, in the same manner as legitimates.
But this act gave no power to legitimates to inherit from the illegitimates or vice versa. A died in 1896, being the illegitimate
daughter of X, who subsequently married another than A's
father, and had eight children. No mother or grandmother
survived A. It was held that the eight legitimate children of
X could not inherit and that the property escheated to the state, 3
K, an illegitimate son of X, dying in 1888, leaving a widow,
and a legitimate, son of X, the land belonged to the widow in the
absence of kindred capable of inheriting it.38 A legitimate child
of X dying, her illegitimate son could not inherit.3'
LEGITIMATES FROM ILLEGITIMATES AND

Vice vers.7.

The act of June 10th, 1901 P. L. 551 enacts that all chil-

dren, legitimate or not, of the same mother, and dying without
leaving children or others entitled to inherit under the present
laws, "shall have capacity to inherit from each other." It is
not probable that the provision was intended to be repealed by
the act, July 10th, 1901. On the contrary, that act directs that
each illegitimate child shall be considered of the half-blood to
every other child of the same mother, whether legitimate or not.
Hence, an illegitimate son of X may, as a half-brother, inherit
from a legitimate son."
INHERITANCE FROM ILLEGITIMATES.

THE MOTHER.

The act of April 27th, 1855, declares that the illegitimates
"and their mother shall respectively have capacity to take or in26Woltemate's Appeal, 86 Pa. 219. This led to the passage of the
act of June 5th, 1883; Kennedy's Estate, 9 C. C. 230.
31

McCully's Estate, 12 Supr. 78.

The act of June 14, 1897 did not

give the power.
Kennedy's Estate, 9 C. C. 230.
3
Glasz's Estate, 43 Leg. Int. 46.
4"Kilburn's Estate, 21 Lane. 246.

The act of June 5th, 1883 says

that illegitimate children, born of the same mother *

*

*

shall

have capacity to take from each other. Under this act the issue of an
illegitimate could not inherit from another of the illegitimate children.
Herbein's Estate, 2 Chest. 449.
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herit from each other" real and personal property. This renders the mother as competent to inherit from the illegitimate as
from the legitimate child. Hence, A, illegitimate son of X, dying, leaving his mother X and his widow, the real estate passed
to his mother X subject to the widow's dower in one-half of it.4
The mother inherits and not the putative father. 42
INHERITANCE BY RELATIVES OF MOTHER.

Under the act of 1855 only the children could inherit from
the mother, and she from one of them. If she had died before
the child, her relatives would not inherit, e. g. her mother, 3 her
brothers and sisters, or the children of her brothers and sisters.
The property of the child, these being the only. other claimants,
would escheat to the commonwealth." The act of July 10th,
1901 P. L. 639 gives power to inherit from the illegitimate, to
the mother, her heirs and legal representatives. Its intent is declared to be to legitimate the illegitimate child and its heirs, as
to its mother and her heirs.
LEGITIMATION BY SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE.

The act of May 14th, 1857 P. L. 507'" enacts that "In any
and every case where the father and mother of an illegitimate
child or children shall enter into the bonds of lawful wedlock
and cohabit, such child or children shall thereby become legitimated, and enjoy all the rights and privileges as if they had
been born during the wedlock oi their parents"'"
It is not relevant to the theme of this article, to discuss the facts which
legitimate under the statute. When they exist they entitle the
offspring before the marriage to be regarded as if born after
marriage.
The pre-nuptial offspring may inherit from the
"Neil's Appeal, 92 Pa. 193.
12Killam v. Killam, 39 Pa. 120.
43
Steckel's Appeal, 64 Pa. 493. The case, says Sharswood, J., of
grand-mothers is excluded.
"Grubb's Appeal, 58 Pa. 55.
453 Stewart's Purd. 2445.
"6After the death of the mother of bastard children, who, after their
birth had married their father prior to 1857 (the marriage therefore not
legitimating the children) an act of assembly legitimating them the effect
being to divest the estate which had devolved from her upon her brothers

and sisters,' and to pass it to the children would be unconditional.
man v. Heist, 5 W. & S. 171.

Nor-
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father,'

from the father's brother,"8 from the mother's brother.'
SPECIAL LEGITIMATION.

Prior to the constitution of 1874, legitimation by special act
of assembly was not unknown. A special act is found in Killam v. Killam.'
Killam had had two children by Elizabeth, of
whom he was not husband. At his instanee, the act of April
15th, 1853 was passed to the effect that.George W. K., son,
and Emily M., daughter, of George Killam, *
* shall have
and enjoy all the rights and privileges and advantages of children born in lawful wedlock, and shall be able and capable in
law to inherit and transmit any estate whatsoever as full and
completely to all intents and purposes, as if they had been born
in lawful wedlock."
This was held to have made them legitimate to all intents. George W. K. subsequently died, seised of
land, and without issue; his sister, Emily M, now the wife of
Tyler, claiming the land as heir, conveyed it to X. In ejectment by George Killam, the father, against X, it was held that
on the death of George W., his father and mother took a life
estate and his sister a fee. At the sister's death, the land descended to her heirs. Her mother's conveyance to X passed
only what she had, viz. a life estate in a moiety. George Killam,
the plaintiff, owning the other moiety for life, could recover this
joint undivided moiety. A devise was made in 1813, to the testator's daughter E for life; remainder to "the lawful issue" of
E; if there should be no lawful issue, then to E's brothers and
sisters. E had already an illegitimate daughter. This daughter married and had children, and died May 24th, 1854, leaving
her brothers and five children surviving. On March 31, 1854,
an act of assembly had been passed providing that this illegitimate daughter of E "shall have and enjoy all the rights and
41Clauer's Appeal, 11 W. N. 427; Staiger's Estate, 7 Dist. 351;
Com. v. Gilkeson, 18 Super. 516. (No collateral inheritance tax is payable.) A child born before the father's will is written but legitimated
afterwards is not an afterborn child in the sense of the act of April 8th,
1833, making a testator die intestate as to such child if not provided for
in the will. McCul och's Appeal, 113 Pa. 247.
48Agnew's Estate, 11 C. C. 137.
190iver's Estate, 184 Pa. 306. A marriage of man and woman in
England, after they have had children, will legitimate them, in contemplation of our courts, in the disposition of property here.
039 Pa. 120.
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privileges of a child born in lawful wedlock, and shall be able
and capable in law to inherit and transmit any estate whatsoever,
as fully and completely, to all intents and purposes as if she had
been born in lawful wedlock." The children of the daughter of
E were held to take under the will of 1813. They were "lawful issue," at the time of the death of E.5 '
LEGTIMATION

BY FOREIGN LAW.

Although the law of another state or country is allowed to
determine the'validity of a marriage occurring there, and the
consequent legitimacy of the issue of the persons thus married,
the legitimacy of issue, not legitimate at birth, cannot be ordained by the law of another state or county, so as to be valid in
Pennsylvania. A resident of Tennessee had an illegitimate
daughter, who on his petition, was legitimated by a decree of a
court of that state. While she thus became his legitimate daughter in Tennessee, she continued to be illegitimate here, and, on
the death of X (a brother of her father) who had already died,
owning land here, she did not become an heir. The legitimation
"forgives the vice of her birth in Tennessee, but not here. *
*
A capacity in Tennessee does not prove capacity here.""2
POSTHUMOUS CHILD.

A child en ventre sa mere at the death of an ancestor, if
subsequently born, alive, is capable of inheriting, as much as if
he had been born at the ancestor's death. Such a child is "in
law born for all purposes of inheritance." '
He takes in defiance
"of a will of his parent that has made no provision for him."' He
takes, under a devise to the testator's children or grandchildren,
unless a contrary intention appears in the will.' But if an unborn
child is subsequently born dead, no estate attaches to him under
51Miller's Appeal, 52 Pa. 113. Cf. McGunnigle v. McKee, 77 Pa. 81.
52

Smith v. Derr, 34 Pa. 126.

tm

ILaird's Appeal, 85 Pa. 339. Swift v. Duffield, 5 S. & R. 38. If the
estate has provisionally descended on another, it will be taken from him,
on the birth of the child. "Nay," says Blackstone, "even if the estate
has descended by the death of the owner, to such brother, or nephew, or
daughter in the former cases the estate shall be divested and taken
away by the birth of a posthumous son." 2 Comm. 208.
5m
Kolb v. Komp, 3 Y. 164. McKnight v. Read, 1 Wh. 213; May v.
Espenshade, 1 Pears. 139.
-5 Swift v. Duffield, 5

S.& R. 38. Cf. Wells v. Ritter, 3 Wh. 208.
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the intestate law, and he cannot, therefore, transmit any estate. A
died, leaving a widow, who was then enceinte, a sister, nephews
and niece.s. The child was subsequently born dead. The widow's
contention that it had taken a share of the personalty of its
father, and had transmitted it to her as its mother, was rejected.'
LINEAL ASCENT OF LAND.

The first rule or cannon of inheritance, laid down by
Blackstone' is "that inheritances shall lineally descend to the
issue of the person who last died actually seised, in infini/um,
but shall never lineally ascend."
This "total exclusion of parents and all lineal ancestors from succeeding to the inheritance
of their offspring" he remarks, "is peculiar to our own laws,
and such as have been deduced from the same original.""8 The
intestate law of this state, in the absence of issue, gives a life
estate to parents, as agaitist brothers and sisters of the whole
blood and their issue. It gives them a fee, in preference to
brothers and sisters of the half blood, or to any other relatives.
In default of issue, brothers and sisters of the whole blood, or
their issue, parents, and brothers and sisters of the half blood
or their issue, the intestate law gives the land to the next of kin.
It does not exclude from this class, the ancestors of the deceased, his grand-parents, or great-grand-parents, etc. Hence,
the grand-mother, . 9 a great-grand-father on the mother's side'
will inherit if the nearest of the kin who are capable of inheriting.
5Martin's Estate, 8 C. C. 212.

-12Comm. 208.

m2

Comm. 210. He remarks that the Hebrew and the Roman law allowed the father to inherit either to the exclusion of, or in participation
with brothers and sisters.
59
May v. Espenshade, 1 Pears. 139. Cf. McDowell v. Addams, 45 Pa.
430.
6Sturgeon v. Hustead, 196 Pa. 148.

252

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

MOOT COURT
TENANT v. HOOPER.
Habit as Evidence of an Act.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Tenant was a farm hand of Hooper's who had agreed to pay him $5
a week and board him. Tenant sues Hooper for wages for four months.
Hooper testified that he had paid all the wages due and offers evidence
to prove that he has constantly employed three farm hands and it is his
habit to pay them every two weeks. Court rejected evidence. Verdict
for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. Motion for a new trial.
Westover for Plaintiff.
Burd for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
EVANS, J.-The evidence rejected by the court should have been
received. It was material and relevant. Material because it had a legitimate and effective influence or bearing on the decision of the case, 16
Cyc. 848, And relevant because it touched upon the issue which the
parties have made by their pleadings so as to assist in getting at the
truth of facts disputed. 16 Cyc. 847.
Evidence that defendant was in the habit to pay every two weeks,
makes it more probable that plaintiff was paid this way. Such evidence
would raise a presumption that the plaintiff was paid, and he would have to
prove the contrary. It would be an aid to get at the truth of facts of the
case. Wharton on Evidence, Vol. II, p. 631, says, "Where a question is
whether a particular workman has been paid back wages, it is admissible to
prove that other workmen employed by defendant were paid by him
every week," and the same presumption maybe shown by other habits
of payment, 4 C. & P. 80.
Hooper testified that he paid Tenant. He also brings in three other
farm hands to testify that they received their salary every two weeks;
by this means Hooper tries to prove a regular habit, and his reputation
for paying wages. Such evidence was for the jury, and we think the
Court erred in rejecting the evidence. It is a custom among farmers to
pay their help in cash, and they do not take receipts. This being so, it
would lead to fraud to exclude such evidence when there is a question of
veracity between the farmer and the help. This evidence was all that
Hooper had, and to exclude it was not only unjust to him, but gives
Tenant a sword to commit fraud, that we think should be prevented.
Let us suppose Tenant claimed wages for two years; under the circumstances, he could have gotten it. Surely no one will hesitate to pronounce it a fraudulent practice, and we are all agreed that it is the duty
of the court to check fraudulent practices and admit all material and
relevant evidence to check it.
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Tenant denied that he was paid every two weeks and Hooper
claimed that he was. There was witness against witness. A question
of veracity. This being so, corroboration of Tenant or Hooper was important. Should the Court receive the evidence rejected? It was that
Hooper hired other farm hands, that they always received their salary
every two weeks. It is easier to believe that the dealings with Tenant
were as he alleged, when it appears that his dealings with other farm
hands were of this sort than it would be otherwise, and for the purpose
of corroboration, we think the evidence should have been received.
We are aware that in some cases proof of the habit of doing of a
certain kind of act has been excluded as evidence of doing of that
act at the time in question. Baker v. Irish, 172 Pa. 528. Morris v.
Guffy, 188 Pa. 534. On the other hand evidence of habit was received to
justify the inference, that an act of the same sort was done. In
Meighen v. The Bank, 25 Pa. 288, evidence of the custom and usuages of
the bank, as corroborative, or explanatory of a fact was received,57 Pa.,
339. In an action for injury to the plaintiff, whilst on detendant's cars,
by a collision with another train, evidence of the habits and competency of the conductor of the later train is pertinent, also held. Where
a habit of intoxication in a conductor is shown, it raises a presumption of
negligence in case of accident. 82 Pa. 236 held: "It was a very natural
conclusion that aman who had always paid his taxes promptly, would have
paid them on the tiube of sale promptly. This therefore was a question
for the jury and not for the court."
In view of the fact that the lower court erred, we award a new
trial.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
There can be no doubt that evidence that a person was in the habit
of doing a certain act has probative value -where the issue is whether he
did on a specific occasion, the act which is the subject of the habit.
Everyday experience and reasoning make this clear.
"It would seem to be axiomatic that a man is likely to do a thing or
not to do it in a particular way, according as he is in the habit of doing
it." S. v. Railroad, 52 N. H. 52, per Sergeant, J. The admissibility of
such evidence has been asserted in many cases. See Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 92 et seq.
In Shoneman v. Feley, 14 Pa. 376, after a witness had testified that
"he did not know whether he gave a receipt for a note or not," he was
asked whether he "usually gave receipts for notes received." The
question was held to be improper on the ground that the fact sought to
be established could not be proved by evidence of a general practice, after the witness had disclaimed knowledge in the particular instance. It
will be observed that the witness' belief in the invariability of his habit
was not sufficiently persuasive to convince him that he had followed his
habit in the particular instance.
On the other hand, in Meighen v. Bank, 25 Pa. 291, after the cashier
of the bank had sworn positively that the plaintiff made no deposit on a
certain day, and had given as a reason that he stated so from the books
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and from his recollection, he was permitted to testify that "it was the
-invariable custom of the bank to balance the books every evening. If
plaintiff had made a deposit that day, I would have entered the deposit
on the daily receipts; and this is one reason for my belief that he made
no such deposit."
The Supreme Court held that the evidence was properly admitted saying, "Had the evidence of the custom of the bank been
offered of itself to disprove the liability of the bank on the certificate in
question it might have been liable to objection, but it was given merely
as one of the reasons which induced the conclusion of the cashier, and
for this purpose was plainly admissible."
Schoneman v. Fegley was
distinguished by reason of the fact that the witness in that case had
not stated that he had given a receipt but that he did not know whether
he had given one or not.
Subsequent cases have been interpreted (Meighan v. Bank and
Schoneman v. Fegley) as holding that evidence of customs and usuages
is not conmpetent in itself, to establish a fact, but may be received and
submitted to the jury as corroborative or explanatory of facts already
proved. Custer v. Fidelity Association, 211 Pa. 262; Moyer v. Berndt, 19
Dist. Rep. 869; Morris v. Guffey, 218 Pa. 541. And it has been held proof
of habit or custom is permissible only by way of corroboration and not as
substantive evidence to establish a controverted fact. Custer v. Fidelity
Association; Moyer v. Berndt, 29 Dist. Rep. 869; Morris v. Guffey, 211
Pa. 262.
When a witness testifies that he did a certain thing at a certain
time and states as his reason for so testifying, that it was his habit to
do that thing at that time, he is in reality merely testifying to the existence of a habit which he thinks is invariable. It is difficult to see why
the evidence of the habit is not under such circumstances substantive
evidenceAdmitting, however, that under the Pennsylvania authorities it may
be that evidence of habit is only admissible as corrobative of other evidence, nevertheless the learned court below did not err in admitting the
evidence as to the existence of the habit. The witness had stated positively that he had paid the plaintiff in full, and although he had not t~stified that he had paid him every two weeks, i. e., in conformity with the
habit, we think the evidence of the habit was corrobative of his former
testimony and under the authority of Meighan v. Bank was properly admitted. See also, Insurance Co. v. Robinson, 56 Pa. 257 and Moyer v.
Berndt, 19 Dist. 870.

INGERSOLL v. CULPEPPER.
Irijury by Vicious Bull.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Culpepper owned a large farm. In one of the fields he kept cattle
among which was a fierce bull.
Occasionally people crossed through
this field, but without Culpepper's consent. Ingersoll while thus crossing
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was attacked and nearly killed by the bull. There was a notice at the
fence warning trespassers from entering the field, but Ingersoll did not
see it, nor know of it.
Locke for Plaintiff.
Durkin for Defendant.
OPINION OF COURT.
WALLACE, J.-This is an action for damages. The plaintiff seeks
to recover for injuries received from ar attack by a fierce bull while
crossing the plaintiff's land, the defendant having a sign out warning
trespassers. It appears that people crossed through the field- and that
the plaintiff did not see the trespass sign. The question is, whether the
defendant is liable for injuries resulting from keeping a ferocious bull.
In 2 Am. & Eng. Enc. 364 it is said: "If domestic animals are rightfully
in their place where they do the injury complained of, the owner will not
be liable, unless he had knowledge of the vicious propensities of such
animal, and in an action knowledge on the part of the owner of the
vicious propensities must be proved." It does not appear from the facts,
neither has the counsel for the plaintiff proved knowledge of the vicious
propensities on the part of the defendant.
The customary place for a bull like others of its kind is in a field
properly fenced. This is necessary to the health of cattle. And if the
owner take proper precautions as the defendant herein did, there is no
reason why he should be held liable for any injuries that a negligent
trespasser might receive. The law surely will not require a man to keep
off trespassers, for fear of receiving injury from his cattle, when he had
no knowledge of the ferocity or viciousness of any particular cow or
Bulls are by nature, somewhat fierce, yet they are a necessary
steer.
part of the cattle business. It is not as if the defendant had a lion or a
tiger running loosely in his field; the law would be otherwise in that
case.
The plaintiff was negligent in not taking precaution, before entering
the field. The defendant had a trespass sign up and if he did not see it,
that was his fault. In Marble vs. Ross, 124 Mass. 44, it was held that
the test is whether the plaintiff in entering the pasture exercised that
degree of care which reasonable and prudent men use under like circumstances. The plaintiff in the case at the bar, did not exercise that degree of care, as an ordinary man would stop to consider whether he
would be allowed to go on this land and seeing the cattle would naturally
wonder whether they were liable to attack him. In Gregg v. Gregg, 55
Pa 227, it was held that "A recovery cannot be had in any case for
damage which the negligence or misfeasance of the plaintiff contributed
to bring on himself."
In Curtis vs. Schlosser, 14 Pa. City Reports, it was held that "the
burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show negligence on the part of an
owner, even when an animal belongs to the class having known dangerous
The defendant was not guilty of negligence in keeping
propensities."
the bull, as he had the field in which the bull was kept properly fenced;
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that is to say he"exercised the care ordinarily used in keeping cattle, and
if the plaintiff, through his own negligence in not noticing the "sign to
trespassers" went in the field he did so at his own peril, and can not recover.
In view of the facts and of the numerous authorities cited by the
able counsel for the defense, let judgment be entered for the defendant.
Judgment for defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
It is a well settled rule that if a person keeps an animal mans.etnaturme, of a ferocious or vicious disposition, accustomed to attack mankind or injure property, knowing that it is possessed of such disposition,
he is bound to restrain the animal at his peril, and is accountable for all
the injury such animal may do without proof of any negligence or fault
in the keeping, and regardless of the owner's endeavors to so keep the
animal as to prevent mischief. 2 Cyc. 368.
The principle is of ancient origin. Anthorities much older and certainly just as respectable as the common law courts assert it. It is
found in the Mosaic law. In the twenty-ninth chapter of the book of
Exodus, it is written, "If the ox were wont to push with his horn in
time past, and it hath been testified to his owner, and he bath not kept
him in, but that he bath killed a man or woman, the ox shall be stoned
and his owner also shall be put to death."
In the Twelve Tables of Rome it was provided that "if a horse, apt
to kick, should strike with his foot, or if an ox, accustomed to gore should
wound any man with his horns, an action was given to the party injured."
Cooper's Inst. 351.
The Code of Hammurabi provided that "If a man's bull has been
wont to gore, and they have made known to him his habit of goring, and
he hath not protected his horns, or bath not tied him up, and that bull
gore the son of a man, and bring about his death, he shall pay one-half
mana of silver. If it be the servant of a man he shall pay one-third
mana of silver." Sec. 250.
The courts of Pennsylvania have adopted the principle enunciated by
these worthy predecessors. Com. v. Fourteen Hogs, 10 S. & R. 393;
Campbell v. Brown, 19 Pa. 361; Mahn v. Weiand,* 81 Pa. 254; Earhart v.
Youngblood, 27 Pa. 331; Sylvester v. Maag, 155 Pa. 225; Curtis v.
Schlosser, 14 Co. Ct. Rep. 600; McDonald v. Jodrey, 8 Ca. Ct. 172.
The principle on which this rule rests has been said to be, that "a
ferocious animal, liable to do injury to men or property is a nuisance,
and that keeping of it after notice of such liability is so wrongful that
the owner is chargeable for any neglect to keep it with such care that it
cannot do 'damage." Mann v. Weiand, 81* Pa. 254. The gist of the action is not the negligent keeping but the keeping with knowledge of the
animal's vicious disposition. Campbell v. Brown, 19 Pa. 361; Mann v.
Weiand, 81* Pa. 254; Earhart v. Youngblood, 27 Pa. 831. Rossell v.
Cotton, 31 Pa. 525.
The defendant in the present case does not deny the existence or the
wisdom of the rule as above stated, but contefids that it has no applica-
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tion to the case at bar because (1) it was not proved that he had knowledge of the bull's vicious disposition; (2) the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence; (3) the plaintiff was a trespasser.
(1) In an action to recover damages forinjuries inflicted by an act of an
animal, which is not usual with one of its class, but is attributed solely
to the vicious propensity of the individual animal, it is necessary to aver
and prove the scienter. Com. v. Fourteen Hogs, 10 S. & R. 393; Campbell v. Brown; 19 Pa. 361; Mann v. Weiand, 81* Pa. 243; Earhart vYoungblood, 27 Pa. 331; Sylvester v. Maag, 155 Pa. 225; Curtis v.
Schlosser, 14 Co. Ct. 600; Mulherrin v. Henry, 11 Co. Ct. 49. The
burden of proving the scienter is upon the plaintiff. Sylvester v. Maag,
155 Pa. 255; Curtis v. Schlosser, 14 Co. Ct., 600; Mulherrin v. Henry, 11
Co. Ct., 49; Mann v. Weiand, 81* Pa. 253, 2 Cyc. 368. See as apparently contra Troth v. Wells, 8 Super. Ct. 5.
It has been held, however, that no proof of scienter is necessary (1)
when at the time the injury was committed the animal was a trespasser
upon the lands of the plaintiff. Dolph v. Ferris, 7 W. & S. 369, 2 Cyc.
376; (Troth v. Wells, 8 Sup. 1, qualifies this general principle); (2) When
though the animal is one of a class which is not ordinarily vicious, the act
complained of is one which a reasonably prudent person might anticipate
under the circumstances. Goodman v. Gay, 15 Pa. 193; (3) Where the
animal is one of a class which is of a wild and fierce nature, naturally
and inherently vicious.
In applying the rule established by the second class of cases the
courts have simply distinguished between the natural and abnormal
habits of domestic animals. The liability of the owner in this class of
cases must be predicated upon a negligent keeping. Goodman v. Gay, 15
Pa. 193. McDonald v. Jodrey, 8 Co. Ct. 142. The liability of the owner
in cases which fall within the third class is absolute. Com. v. Fourteen
Hogs. In either cases proof of scienter is unnecessary.
The present case does not belong to either of these classes, though
there is some authority to the effect that the ownpr of a bull is liable
for attacks made by it without proof that the owner knew of its vicious
disposition. Smith v. Cook, I Q. B. Div. 79. In the great majority of the
cases in which the liability of an owner of a bull has been considered the
court has either tacitly Assumed or expressly stated that proof of scienter
is necessary. Mann v. Weiand, 81* Pa. 254; Earhart v. Youngblood, 27
Pa. 331; Clowdes v. Fresno Co., 118 Cal. 315; 50 Pac. 373; Talmage v.
Mills, 80 N. Y. Supp. 637. In Dolph v. Ferres, 7 W. & S. 369, the court,
said, "A bull is an animal mansuetee naturae, and has no natural propensity to gore horses and thereby injure or destroy them, and being such
an animal, if he does destroy the horse of a neighbor, his owner is not
liable for it unless it can be shown that the owner knew or had notice
previously that his bull was disposed to gore animals of the horse kind."
The court added, "This would seem to be the rule that has generally prevailed." The first contention of the defendant is, therefore, approved.
(2) Contributory negligence of the person injured is a bar to a recovery of
damages for the injuries inflicted by an animal belonging to another.
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Sylvester v. Magg, 155 Pa. 225; Mann v. Weiand, 81* Pa. 253; Earhart
v. Youngblood, 27 Pa. 331; Marbler v. Ross, 124 Mass. 49.
In the present case, however, it does not appear that the plaintiff
knew that the bull was vicious, or that it was in the field, or that he saw
the sign or that he could have seen it by the exercise of reasonable
care, or that if he had seen it, it would have apprised him of the fact that
there was a bull in the field.
The evidence was certainly not sufficient to justify the court in holding that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence as a matter of law. In
Marble v. Ross, 124 Mass. 49 the plaintiff was injured while walking
through a field in which he knew there was a vicious bull confined. The
court held that it could not say as a matter of law that the plaintiff was
guilty of contributory negligence. It is not necessarily contributory
negligence to go on premises where a sign of warning "Beware of the
Dog" is displayed. Sylvester v. Maag, 155 Pa. 225.
The second contention of the plaintiff is therefore disapproved.
(3) There is authority to the effect that the fact that the person injured was at the time of the injury a trespasser does not constitute a defence to an action for the injuries suffered. In Marble v. Ross, 124 Mass.
49, the defendant knowingly kept a dangerous stag in a large pasture
and the plaintiff while trespassing in the pasture was attacked and injured by the stag. The defendant requested the courts to charge that if
the plaintiff was a trespasser he could not recover. The supreme court
held that the instruction was rightly refused saying, "The mere fact that
the plaintiff was trespassing on the defendant's lands would not defeat
the right of action. The unlawful character of the act did not contribute
to the injury or affect defendant's negligence."
In a recent English case, the plaintiff while walking across the defendant's field was injured by a horse which the defendant knew to be
vicious. The public had been accustomed to use the field as a, short cut
bat the defendant had objected. The defendant had given no notice of
the vicious disposition of the horse. He was held liable.
In Glidden v. Moore (Neb.) 15 N. W. 326, and Mahoney v. Droyer,
32 N. Y. Supp, 386, the facts were substantially similar and the ruling
was to the same effect. It will be observed, however, that in ah three
cases there was a quasi way across the clefendant's lands which the public
were accustomed to use and that no notice was given.
In Loomis v. Ferry, 17 Wend. 495, the owner of a dog of known mischievious disposition was held liable for injuries inflicted upon a trespasser. There was evidence tending to show that the dog was kept for
that purpose and no notice had been given to the public. Moreover, the
court said that the case was different from the case where "a useful domestic animal, a mischievous bull for instance, was kept in a remote inclosure."
On the other hand, in Kemmouth v. McDougal, 19 N. Y. Supp. the
court, after statiug the general rule as to the liability for the acts of
vicious animals, said, "It is true that this rule might not be applied when
the plaintiff was wrongfully on the premises of the defendant and the
animal was so kept by the owner that no injury would have been done to
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the owner but for his illegal act." See also Woodbridge v. Marks, 43
N. Y. Supp. 156.
This proposition finds support in some Pennsylvania cases. In Earhart v. Youngblood, 27 Pa. 331 it is said, 'The public are entitled to act
upon the presumption that all dangerous animals are properly confined
and are therefore exonerated from any special caution against them
except when, without right, they go upon the owner's land and within
the place where they may be lawfnlly kept."
In Sylvestar v. Maag., 155 Pa. 223 it was held that in order that a
person might be entitled to recover for injuries inflicted by a vicious dog,
it was necessary to prove that the plaintiff was rightfully on defendant's
premises.
The rule asserted in Marble v. Ross is, as applied to the facts in the
present case, unduly restrictive of the beneficial uses of a mani's real estate for the purpose of preventing a remote and contingent injury. The
third contention of the defendant is, therefore, approved.
Judgment affirmed.

BARCLAY v. BANNAN.
Damages for Breach of Warranty of Horse.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Bannan sold a horse to Barclay for one hundre'! dollars, and warranted it to be sound and free from blemish. The horse would have been
worth one hundred and fifty dollars had it been sound. It, in fact,
shortly after sale died from diseases existing at the time of sale of which
disease both parties were ignorant at the time of sale.
Larkin for Plaintiff.
Evans for Defendant.
OPINION OF COURT.
LOCKE, J.-The first question in this case is, whether or not the defendant is liable on the warranty.
Here he warranted that the horse was sound and free from blemish,
believing the horse to be so.
Express warranty is any affirmation of fact or any promise by seller
relating to the goods, if the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise
is to induce the buyer to purchase goods, and if the buyer purchases the
goods relying thereon. Tiffany on Sales p. 236. In case of warranty it
is immaterial whether the seller knew that his statements were true or
not. 26 Pa. 227; 15 Mass. 319; 20 Conn. 271; 51 N. Y., 108.
The second question is as to the measure of damages. The buyer
may maintain an action in assumpsit against the seller for breach of
warranty, either express or implied. 66 Pa. 340; 120Pa. 583; 26 Pa. 277.
The measure of damages here is the difference between the value of
the horse in a sound state, and his value in a diseased state, without regard to the purchase price. 4 Pa. 168; 30 N. J. 454.
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It is equitable that the vendor should pay the plaintiff to the amount
of $150, because he has warranted the horse, and if it was such as warranted, the horse would have been worth $150.
The plaintiff, relying on
this warranty, suffered the loss of $150. He would not have purchased the
horse if he had known its condition. The consequence of the horse being
diseased when warranted sound, was the damages, and the damages suffered by the plaintiff were brought on by the fault of defendant, and he
must answer for what he caused.
Verdict for plaintiff for $150.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
As early as 1801 it was held in Pennsylvania that "If one sells a
horse, warranting him to be sound, the contract will bind the vendor,
whether he was ignorant at the time of the horse's being disordered or
not." Kimmell v. Lichly, 3 Yeates 262. This rule was applied in Vanleer v. Earle, 26 Pa. 277, where in an action for damages for a breach of
warranty of the soundness of the horse it was held that "the plaintiff
may recover on an express warranty without alleging or proving the
knowledge of the defendant that it was false." This rule prevails in
most jurisdictions. 35 Cyc. 378; 30 A. & E. 131.
The ordinary measure of damages for a breach of warranty is "the
difference between the actual value of the article sold and the value of
the same article if it had been such as the vendor warranted it to be."
This rule is applicable where the subject of the warranty is a horse.
"The measure of damages is not the consideration or price paid but the
difference between the actual value of the horse and its value if sound
with interest from the date of sale." Freyman v. Knecht, 78 Pa. 144;
Colliers v. Keevers, 4 Pa. 168.
Applying the foregoing rule to the facts of the present case the
learned court below has awarded the plaintiff $150 damages.
To do so the court below must have assumed (1) that in estimating
the actual value of the horse its value at the time of trial should be considered; (2) that a dead horse is valuless.
Both of these assumptions were incorrect In estimating the actual
value of the horse for the purpose of applying the rule as to the measure of damages, its value at the time of delivery and not its value at
some subsequent time is to be considered. Morse v. Arnfield, 15 Super.
Ct. 140; 30 A. & E. 209; 35 Cyc. 417.
The fact that the horse died shortly after the sale from diseases existing at the time of the sale does not prove that it was worthless at the
time of delivery, and this is the time which the law regards in estimating
the actual value. The value of the horse at the time of delivery may
have been slight but it should have been considered in estimating the
amount of the plaintiff's damage.
-Between the time of the delivery and the time of death the plaintiff
had the use of the horse, and there is authority to the effect that this
must be considered in estimating the damages.
In Irwin v. Rankin, Add. 146, it appeared that Rankin had sold a
horse to Irwin with a warranty of soundness. Two weeks after the sale
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the horse died. In an action on the warranty it was held, "If the horse
was at the time of sale unsound of a disease, of which he afterwards
died, Rankin must bear the loss, allowingfor the profits, if any, made of
the laborof the horse subsequent to the sale."
The judgment of the learned court below is reversed and upon the new
trial the court is advised to consider 'whether the doctrine of Kline v.
Wood, 9 S. & R. 299, where it is held that, though the measure of damages for a breach of warranty of a horse is the difference between the
value of a sound and unsound horse, the damages can never exceed the
price given for the horse, is applicable to the present case.

BARTON v. PENNA. R. R. CO.
Negligent Killing by Railroad.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
John Barton bought a ticket for a point on the railroad twenty miles
off, an hour before the train started. Meantime he visited certain
places in the town on business. His last visit brought him to within one
hundred yards of the station. While there he heard the train approaching on which he was to go, and hastened to the station. Between him
and the track on which his train w. s, was a parallel track on which was
coming at the rate of thirty miles an hour, a freight train. This train
he could not see owing to the nature of the ground and the darkness.
He did not hear it owing to the noise made by the train on which he was
going. As he was running on the to him nearer track he was struck by
the advancing train and killed.
His widow sues for his negligent killing.
He did not stop, look or listen, before going upon the track. Verdict for $15,000.
M6tion for a new trial.
Peppets for Plaintiff.
Locke for Defendant.
OPINION OF COURT.
MYERS, J.-The Act of April 15, 1851, P. L. 669, provides as follows:
Sec. 19, "That whenever death shall be occasioned by unlawful violence or
negligence and no suit for damages be brought by the party injured during
his or her life, the widow of any such deceased, or if there be no widow, the
personal repesentative, may maintain action for and recover damages
for the death thus occasioned."
The first question to be decided in this case is whether the Pa. R. R.
Co., defendant below, was negligent in allowing a train running at a
high rate of speed to pass between a train that was receiving passengers
and the station. That the Railroad Company was negligent is undoubted.
(33 Cyc. 808.) This very question has been decided affirmatively in both
the Superior and the Supreme Courts of Pennsylvania as well as in other
States. (Flanigan vs. Pnila. R. R. etc.; 181 Pa. 237; Girton vs. Lehigh
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Valley R. R., 17 Pa. Sup. 143;-Atlantic City Ry. vs. Goodwin, 45 L. R.
A. 671 (N. J.); Jewett vs. Klein, 27 N. J. Equity 550.
Unless John Barton was guilty of contributory negligence in crossing
the tracks in the manner in which he did, the plaintiff in the suit should
recover. We must here consider whether the deceased failed to use ordinary care and caution. What may be deemed ordinary care in one case
may under different surroundings and circumstances be gross negligence
(144 U. S. 408). If Barton had been a trespasser on the track he would
certainly have been guilty of contributory negligence in failing to stop,
look and listen, before crossing. And had he been a mere licensee he
might be said to have not exercised ordinary care and caution in crossing
as he did. But Barton was not a trespasser or even a mere licensee.
He was on the track by invitation of the R. R. Co., this invitation being conveyed by his ticket. (2 Browne on Negligence 1418; Bishop on
Non-contract Law, 1092).
From the facts stated it is seen that he was crossing from the station to the train in the way provided by the Railroad Co. Between the
station and his train was a parallel track on which another train was
coming at rate of thirty miles an hour. This train could not be seen or
heard by Barton as he hastened to his train. Did he fail to exercise ordinary care and caution in crossing the intervening track without stopping to look. and listen? We think that he used all the care that was required under the circumstances. Where a person is lawfully on railroad
tracks he is not bound to look and listen if there is nothing to suggest
danger from zny source. (33 Cyc. 833). In this case iiot only was there
nothing to suggest danger from any source, but Barton was right in assuming that the way was clear for one boarding or leaving the passenger
train (Pa. R. R. vs. White; 88 Pa. 327, Flanigan vs. Phila. & C. R. R.
supra; Girton vs. Lehigh Valley R. R., supra; Atlantic City R. R. vs.
Goodwin, 45 L. R. A. 671; Jewett vs. Klein, 27 N. J. Equity 550).
In 15 Pa. Co. lb6 it was held that the rule that persons must "stop,
look and listen" has no exceptions. Yet the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided in Penna. R. R. vs. White, supra, and in Betts vs. Lehigh
Valley R. R., 191 Pa. 575, and the Superior Court in Girton vs. Lehigh
Valley R. R., supra, that a person in getting off a train at a station
need not "stop, look, and listen" before crossing the tracks to the station.
The only difference between the cases cited and the present is that
there the parties were hurt while passing from the train to the station
(except in 191 Pa. 575, where passenger did not go toward the station but
in the opposite direction) while here the deceased was passing from the
station to the train. We do not see how this difference should change
the verdict. In text-books and in cases where a general rule is laid
down concerning passenger trains the rule has been held to apply as well
to persons about to enter as to those about to leave cars (191 Pa. 575; 45
L. R. A. 671).
In Atlantic City R. R. Co. vs. Goodwin, 45 L. R. A. 671, Collins, J.,
said, "A duty to look and listen for trains before stepping upon a railroad track lying between the station and a train discharging and receiving
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passengers at a regular stopping place is not necessarily chargeable, as a
matter of law, upon the passenger alighting from such train and proceeding at once toward the station;" and further on in his opinion he said
that there is no difference between the rights of one entering and one
leaving a train.
In Jewett vs. Klein, 27 N. J. Equity where a person in passing from
the depot to the train he was about to take was killed, the court decided
that he had not been guilty of contributory negligence in that he did not
before approaching the train, look up and down the track to see whether
there was any danger from an approachIng train.
In 12 Phila. 369, several persons were standing on a platform in front
of a station. One of the parties, believing that his train had just arrived, started across an intervening track. He was warned by his con.panions that a train was coming on the track he would have to cross but
he did not "stop, look and listen" and was killed by the train about
which his companions had warned him. The court held that his widow
could not recover on account of his contributory negligence. This case
does not come under the rule laid down by the Pennsylvania and New
Jersey cases. It makes a vast difference whether the injured party had
been warned that a train was coming on the track he was about to cross
or not. So this case is not inconsistent with the decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
Motion for a new trial overruled.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
We think this case properly tlecided. It was plain negligence for the
railroad company to run its freight train at the rate of 30 miles an hour,
over a track over which at the time persons intending to take the passenger train would be likely to pass, and were passing. This train could
not be seen because of the nature of the ground and the darkness. It
could not be heard because of the noise made by the arriving passenger
train. These were reasons for not running a freight train past the station at the time, especially at so great a speed.
The deceased, John Barton, undertook to run to the station, and, in
doing so, had to cross the track on which the freight train was. He did
not stop, nor look, nor listen. Had he stopped, and looked, he would not
have seen the train. Had he stopped, and listened, he would not have
heard it. Then his failure to look and listen was not the cause of his not
seeing and hearing the train.
Under the circumstances of the case, he had a right to assume that
no train would come up, which would imperil him, and hence would not
have been bound to stop, look and listen, even had it been possible, so
doing, to have averted the accident. Besecker v. Delaware, etc., R. R.
Co., 220 Pa. 507.
The able opinion of the learned court below makes a further discussion unnecessary.
Affirmed.
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ERSKINE vs. BOYD.

Trespass of Cattle Made Possible by Malicious Act.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Erskine was the owner of an unfenced cornfield, separated by a road
from a field in which one, Sibley, had a herd of cattle. Boyd, passing by
one night and desiring to cause trouble between Erskine and Sibley,
opened the gate. leading into Sibley's field. The herd wandered into
Erskine's field and did great damage to the corn. Erskine brings trespass
against Boyd.
Shaeffer for Plaintiff.
Rickles for Defendant.
OPINION OF COURT.
BURD, J. -This is an action of trespass brought by Erskine the owner of a cornfield, against defendant, Boyd, who willfully and with intent
to cause trouble between Sibley and Erskine, opened the gate of a field
in which Sibley's cattle were grazing, with the result that the cattle
wandered out through the gate and into Erskine's cornfield which was
directly across the road. The cattle did damage to Erskine's corn, for
which this action is brought.
In Pennsylvania, under act of 1700 which provides, "That all cornfields shall be fenced by a fence five feet high," no right of action would
accrue to plaintiff, as his field was unfenced. However, Sec. I, Act 1700,
relating to fencing of cornfields, was expressly repealed by Act of 1889,
so that now common law on this subject prevails in Pennsylvania. 9 Pa.
C. C. 34; 10 Pa. C. C. 483.
It is well settled at common law "that every unwarranted entry on
another man's land is a trespass, whether it be enclosed or not," 3 Bl.
Com. 209; "and a man is equally liable for tresspass by his cattle as of
himself," 3 B1. Com. 218. Hence there is no doubt but that plaintiff has
a right of action.
The question now presented is, against whom does he have a right of
action? There is no question but that plaintiff has a right of action
against Sibley, the owner of the cattle. 30 N. H. 143 and Vol. 14, Dick.
Law Review 177, which latter case is exactly in point, hold that owneris
liable for damages even though he exercised the utmost care and caution in fencing in his cattle, and though they escaped by wrongful act of
a third party.
The question we now must consider in this case is "Does owner of
cornfield have a right of action against Boyd, the man who opened Sibley's gate?"
Counsel for plaintiff contends defendant is liable.
(1) Claiming that on opening gate, defendant took possession of the
cows and is therefore responsible for their subsequent acts.
(2) That since owner of cornfield has a right of action against owner
of cows, and owner of cows has a right of action against defendant for
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opening his gate, plaintiff in order to avoid a multiplicity of suits, should
be allowed to recover from defendant.
In regard to first point raised by plaintiff, we do not think it can be
said that defendant took possession of cattle. The cattle were still in
Sibley's field grazing, and must still be considered as under his control.
In support of this we cite 30 N. H. 143, where a cow belonging to A was
taken from pasture by B and driven along the road some distance and
then let go its way. It was said that from this period the cow was no
longer under control of B, but was again in legal possession and under
general custody and control of A, the owner.
As to plaintiff's second point, we can find no principle either in law
or equity which would permit Erskine to sue Boyd to avoid a multiplicity
of suits, because Erskine had a right of action against Boyd.
So that if plaintiff is to recover at all in this case, he must recover
on the ground that the injury done to the plaintiff's cornfield by Sibley's
cows was the natural and probable consequence of defendant's opening
the gate of Sibley's field, and in our opinion, such injury was the natural
and probable consequence of defendant's act, and damages are not too
remote to be charged to defendant.
2 Sup. Pa. 85 holds that in determining what is proximate cause, the
rule is that injury must be the natural and probable consequences of the
negligence or wrongful act; such a consequence as under the surrounding circumstances of the case, might and ought to have been foreseen
by wrongdoer as liable to follow from his act. 139 Pa. 363. and 142 Pa.
388, hold that one who commits a negligent act shall be held liable for
what might, in the nature of things, occur in consequence of that negligence, although in advance the actual result might have seemed improbable. And 111 Mass. 135 holds that the injury will not be considered too
remote if according to the usual experience of mankind the result ought
to have been apprehended. Ordinarily the question of proximate cause
is one for the jury, but when the facts are not in dispute, it is for the
court to determine whether the injury was the natural and probable consequences of defendant's wrongful act. 139 Pa. 363; 116 Pa. 344.
In the case at bar; there is no dispute as to the facts, and questions
as to the natural and probable consequences, are for the court to decide.
In applying the principle of proximate cause to the present case, we
can see no reason why defendant is not clearly liable to plaintiff. From
the facts of the case at bar, defendant Boyd opened the gate intending
and apprehending that Sibley's cows would wander out and over into
the cornfield of plaintiff and there destroy his corn; such consequences
the defendant foresaw, and such consequences would have been apprehended by the average man. Plaintiff's field of corn was directly across
the road from Sibley's field and in plain sight of cattle, and it is quite
natural that the cows, following their natural instincts should go across
the road and eat of the corn. Had plaintiff's cornfield been situated some
distance or out of sight from Sibley's field, then there might be some
question as to whether opening of gate was proximate cause of injury to
plaintiff, but from facts and circumstances in the present case, we think
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that opening of gate was proximate cause, and eating of plaintiff's corn
was natural and probable consequences of defendant's wrongful act.
It is a well settled principle of law that "every man who commits a
wrongful or negligent act is liable for the natural and probable consequences of his act." And as defendant clearly did a wrongful act in opening Sibley's gate, and as eating of plaintiff's corn was the natural and
probable consequence of such act, he is liable, and judgment is hereby
given for plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
The conclusion reached by the learned court below is correct. It is
scarcely necessary to trouble one's self with the inquiry whether the invasion of Erskine's field by Sibley's cattle, was the natural and probable
consequence of Boyd's act. It was so far natural, so far probable, that
Boyd expected and intended it to follow. He opened Sibley'sgate because
he "desired" to cause this particular trouble. If a man intending an effect does an act in order to produce that effect which he in fact produces
by it, inquiry into the probability or improbability of the sequence is irrelevant.
Nor does it matter what the forces are which are expected to effectuate the end. They may be purely physical; they may, as in this case,
be, in part, psychological. The instincts of the kine were here one of the
intervening agents. Cows have a disposition to wander in quest of succulent pasture, or otherwise. If obstacles are removed, they will wander. If they wander on a highway and discover a cornfield into which
they can go, the lust of food blends with the vagrant impulse, and they
may be expected to enter the field and make booty of the corn.
All this
was foreseen by Boyd, was intended, was desired. It matters not that
this was not the end, but only a means. Beyond the deivastation of the
cornfield, Boyd saw the anger of Sibley, hisresentment towards Erskine;
his suit of Erskine for damages. Whether these followed on the cattle's
trespass, we are not informed. Possibly not. But the damage to Erskine was intended, and was inflicted. Boyd had no right to inflict it, for
the object he had in view.
Judgment affirmed.

